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5.1  Introduction 
Over the last decade, a large number of bilateral trading arrangements have 
been created, strengthened, or proposed in nearly every region of the world. 
The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the European Union, 
Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), and Mercosur are just a few ex- 
amples of this trend. Furthermore, empirical evidence on bilateral trade flows 
shows that this phenomenon has been accompanied by increased trade region- 
alization, at least in some regions (Frankel, Stein, and Wei, chap. 4 in this 
volume). Therefore, the study of the welfare implications of trading blocs has 
become very relevant. 
One important contributor to the debate has been Krugman (  199  1  a, 199  1  b). 
He uses a model of trade under monopolistic competition to study how welfare 
of the world depends on the number of blocs into which the world is divided. 
In Krugman’s  model, the world is completely symmetrical, so all blocs are 
exactly the same size. He finds that the number of blocs associated with the 
lowest possible welfare is three. The fact that welfare declines starting from 
one bloc (free trade) requires no explanation. The reason for the increase in 
welfare beyond three blocs, however, is more subtle: the distortions associated 
with a given tariff level become smaller as the number of blocs becomes larger 
and consumers buy a larger proportion of the varieties they consume from 
outside the bloc. This happens because a smaller portion of the relative prices 
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are affected by  the tariff.’ The conclusion is that a potential consolidation of 
the world into three trading blocs would have a negative effect on welfare. 
Krugman’s model has been criticized by Deardorff and Stern (1  992) and by 
Haveman (1992) on the grounds that it relies too heavily  on the Armington 
assumption: goods that differ in their country of origin are imperfect  substi- 
tutes. This means that each country will be importing goods from every other 
country in the world. The critics claim that this feature of the model increases 
the likelihood of trade diversion when trading blocs are formed, and therefore 
results in an overly pessimistic view of the prospects for regionalization. 
Deardorff  and  Stern reach  a very  different  conclusion, using  a model  in 
which there are more countries than goods and trade is explained by compara- 
tive advantage. In their model, trading with a few countries is enough to realize 
most of the benefits that trade has to offer. Expected world welfare increases 
monotonically  as the world consolidates  into trading blocs, reaching a maxi- 
mum for the case of  a single bloc, or free trade. However, in order to obtain 
this result, the authors go to the other extreme. This happens because they 
assume that tariffs between countries that are not members of the same bloc are 
infinite! In effect, they eliminate any possibility of trade diversion altogether. 
By adding optimal tariffs to the basic Deardorff and Stern model, Haveman 
obtains results that are rather  similar to Krugman’s: expected  world  welfare 
will be reduced with the expansion of blocs except at the last stage when the 
last barrier falls, resulting  in worldwide free trade. However, for the case of 
exogenous tariffs, his results become consistent with those of Deardorff  and 
Stern: expected world welfare increases monotonically as the number of blocs 
becomes smaller.’ 
There are a number of reasons why studying the effects of  regionalization 
under  the assumption  of  exogenous  tariffs  is important.  One is that  article 
XXIV in GATT does not allow increases in tariffs to outside countries when 
preferential trade agreements (PTAs)  are formed. Moreover, the optimal tariff 
argument does not seem to be what drives governments to impose tariffs. In 
addition, the optimal tariffs calculated by Krugman and Haveman seem to be 
too large in comparison to those we see in the real world (even when tariffs 
are used as shorthand for all protection).  We  are left, then, with  one model 
that is pessimistic regarding the prospects of regionalization, partly due to its 
overstating the extent of trade diversion (product-variety model), and with an- 
other model that is optimistic and probably understates the extent of trade di- 
version (comparative advantage). 
By adding transport costs to the differentiated-products  model, Stein and 
Frankel (1  994) have produced a model that allows the study of how the welfare 
I. The fact that Krugman assumes that tariffs are set optimally contributes to the increase in 
welfare beyond three blocs, but is not crucial for this result. 
2. Haveman actually restricts the tariff level in the bloc to be smaller or equal to that of the least 
protectionist member. Since these restrictions are binding, for our purposes they are equivalent to 
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effects depend on such costs, as well as on the geographical character of trad- 
ing  blocs  (natural  versus  unnatural).  In  addition,  including  transport  costs 
makes the model more realistic regarding the extent of trade diversion, since 
now natural barriers appear that restrict trade between countries that are far 
apart, therefore reducing the amount of trade diversion when blocs are formed. 
In this paper, we go a step further in the direction of resolving the issue of 
the likely welfare effects of  world regionalization in trade, by using a two- 
factor model where trade is explained both by product variety and by compara- 
tive advantage. In fact, by appropriately setting the values of some parameters, 
the model can be transformed into either a pure product differentiation model 
(as in Krugman or Stein and Frankel) or a comparative advantage model. 
In addition, introducing two factors of production will enable us to study 
the welfare implications of the formation of trading blocs among countries at 
different  stages  of  development  (north-south  integration),  as well as those 
formed  among similar countries  (north-north  and  south-south integration).3 
Our framework allows us to evaluate the case of PTAs as well as that of free 
trade areas (FTAs), the effects of transport costs, and the effects of  different 
countries having different tariff levels. 
After setting up the model for the closed economy in the next section, we 
allow for trade in section 5.3. In section 5.4 we study the welfare implications 
of different types of trade arrangements. Section 5.5 offers our conclusions. 
5.2  The Model for the Closed Economy 
We will work with a model where there are three sectors: agriculture (a), 
intermediate inputs (v), and manufactures (m);  and two factors of production: 
capital  (K)  and  labor  (L).4 On the demand  side, consumers  share a Cobb- 
Douglas utility function given by 
(1)  u = M"c;-", 
where 0 < a 5 1, and M  and c, are the consumptions of manufactures and 
agriculture. The Cobb-Douglas specification results in consumers spending a 
fixed proportion of their income on each type of good. 
On the production side, we make the assumption that each factor of produc- 
tion is specific to the production of one good. Agriculture is a homogeneous 
good produced under constant returns to scale, and labor is the only factor used 
in its production. The production function is given by  q, = L, which means 
3. Another model that incorporates both product  variety and comparative advantage can be 
found in Bond and Syropoulos (1993). In their work, however, countries are completely symmetric 
except that each of them is particularly adept at producing a different variety. Therefore, the prob- 
lem of blocs when there are differently endowed countries cannot be tackled with their model. 
Levy (1993) has a two-factor model that combines comparative advantage and product variety 
with a specification that is different from the one used here. He assumes, as do Deardorff and 
Stem, that tariffs are either prohibitive or zero. 
4. The basic structure of our model is in the tradition of  Dixit and Norman (1980). 124  Antonio Spilimbergo and Ernesto Stein 
that each unit of labor is transformed into one unit of agriculture. Therefore, 
given perfect competition,  p, = w,  where pa  is the price of the agriculture good 
and w is the wage. 
There is a very large number of potential varieties of intermediate  inputs, 
which are produced under monopolistic competition and use only capital as a 
factor of production. Increasing returns to scale are introduced by  assuming a 
fixed cost (y) and a constant marginal cost (p): 
where x,  is the production of the ith variety, and Kz  the amount of capital used 
in its production. Each intermediate  input enters symmetrically  into the pro- 
duction of the final manufactured good, produced under a Dixit-Stiglitz tech- 
nology with constant returns to scale: 
(3)  M  = (Zxf)''8, 
where 0 < 8 < 1. This production function results in preference for variety, 
which becomes stronger as the parameter 8 becomes closer to 0. Note that we 
use M to denote both consumption and production per capita of the manufac- 
tured good, since in this model they are always equal.? 
We  assume that each individual is endowed with one unit  of labor and k 
units of capital. In this way, L represents population size as well as labor, and 
k is the capital-to-labor  ratio. The total capital in the economy is, therefore, 
K = kL. Since every individual is equally endowed, we can set aside distribu- 
tive considerations  and work with a representative  agent. Equilibrium in the 
intermediate input market is given by 
(4)  XI  = Lc,. 
Equilibrium in the capital market is given by 
K  = 2  Kt = 2  (px,  + y). 
I=  I  ,=I 
As consumers, the individual maximization problem is 
(6)  max M"c!-"  subject to  Mp,  + cap, = I, 
where I = rk + w is the per capita income. From the first-order conditions we 
can obtain the inverse demand function: 
(7) 
5. In fact, M  could alternatively be interpreted as the utility derived from the consumption of 
the heterogeneous product in a two-good model. In that case, we would have a utility function 
that is Cobb-Douglas  between goods, and Dixit-Stiglitz between varieties. Both specifications 
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As producers  of  the final manufactured  good, individuals  take p, as given 
(since  manufactures  are produced competitively),  and  solve the following 
problem: 
110 
max ($cei)  subject to  tp,c,  = Mp,. 
(=I 
The elasticity of demand for each variety of intermediate inputs can be derived 
from the inverse demand function, which in turn follows from the first-order 
conditions. For a sufficiently large n, it can be approximated by 
(9) 
Note that the elasticity does not depend on the quantity demanded, but only 
on the parameter 0. The firms in the intermediate inputs sector are monopolisti- 
cally competitive and set the price to maximize profits: 
(10) 
Using equation (9) and the first-order condition for profit maximization,  we 
obtain the profit-maximizing price: 
lTt = p,x, -  (Y + Px,)r. 
Since p is the same for all the intermediate  inputs, the price of each variety 
will be the same. Note that the price in equilibrium does not depend on output. 
Free entry condition combined with equation (1  1) yields the output per va- 
riety: 
Introducing equation (12) into the capital market equilibrium condition (5),  we 
get the number of varieties: 
Note that the production of each variety in equilibrium depends only on the 
cost parameters  and on the substitution parameter  8. On the other hand, the 
number of varieties depends on the capital endowment of the economy. The 
fact that production of  each variety in equilibrium is fixed is the result of the 
assumptions made about the production and utility functions, and will be used 
later when solving for the effects of trading blocs. 
Using the zero-profit condition in the final manufactured good sector, and 
plugging  in the equations for n, p,,  and x,, we obtain the price  of  the final 
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Plugging equation (14) into the inverse demand function  (7), substituting for 
M  and pm,  and using w = p, and cn = L, we obtain the relative returns to the 
factors of production: 
Note that the relative price of  the factors of production  depends only on the 
relative endowments  (L  and K),  while  the relative price  (p,/p,)  has a scale 
effect that depends on the capital endowment of the economy: the bigger K is, 
the lower p, is, as can be verified by dividing the left-hand side of  equation 
(14) by pa,  and the right-hand side by w. 
5.3  Allowing for Trade 
We assume that countries have similar tastes, technologies, and population 
size.6  We will proceed in steps. First, we allow for tariffs in a world formed by 
N countries, assuming for the moment that they have the same factor propor- 
tions. In this first step, gains from trade arise only due to increased  variety. 
Next, we introduce capital-rich and capital-poor countries. In this case, there 
are gains due to both comparative advantage and product variety. Note that if 
the parameter  (Y  in the utility function  (1) were equal to 1, all gains would 
come from increase in variety, as in Stein and Frankel (1994). On the other 
hand,  if  the parameter  8 were equal to  1, there would be no preference  for 
variety, and all gains would arise from comparative advantage. Finally, we will 
allow, in turn, for the formation of trading blocs, and for transport costs. 
5.3.1  Allowing for Tariffs in a World with N Identical Countries 
We introduce ad valorem tariffs, uniform across countries, and for the mo- 
ment nondiscriminatory. The tariff revenue is redistributed equally to all con- 
sumers as a lump-sum transfer.'  Now, the producer of the manufactured good 
faces different  prices  for different  varieties  of  the intermediate  inputs,  de- 
pending on whether they are produced at home or abroad. The price of a for- 
eign variety in terms of a domestic one is 
(16) 
The producer of the final good now faces the following problem: 
Pf =  Ph(1 + t). 
6.  A  recent model that addresses the consequences  of  trade between north and south when 
7. We  assume that the number of consumers is sufficiently large that they view  this transfer 
preferences are different is Spilimbergo (1994). 
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(17)  max M =  zce  subject to  zchph  + &p,  5  Mp,.  (  )'" 
The first-order conditions yield 
ii(i -8)  1  1/(1 -  8) 
c,=ch(;)  =.(-)  l+t  . 
In equilibrium, the per capita production of the manufactured good will be 
where 
The zero-profit condition in the production of manufactures yields the price of 
final manufactured goods in terms of the intermediate home variety: 
(8-  i)/e 
(i-nvn  pr  K(l -  6) 
-- 
(i-wn 
(21)  p, =phn(-(;)  = .[  ]  (;) 
Ph 
We  can interpret (l/'P)ci-e)/n  as the price index of  the intermediate inputs in 
terms of the price of the domestic variety. We can see that the price of manufac- 
tures is proportional to the price of the home varieties. As expected, it depends 
negatively on n, the number of varieties produced in each country, due to pref- 
erence for variety in the production function. 
We  have solved the problem of the manufacturer of final goods, who takes 
p, as given. Now we need to solve the problem of the consumer. We  can ex- 
press this problem as 
(22)  max Mv-"  subject to  p,M  + poco  5  rk + w + 7', 
where T is the per capita tariff receipts that are handed back to consumers as 
a lump-sum transfer: 
+- 
#of foreign varielies  consume per variety 
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Substituting pm,  pa,  eel, and A4  in equation (24), we can obtain the consumption 
of the home variety in terms of exogenous parameters: 
Plugging ch  in expression (19), we can find the production of manufactures in 
terms of exogenous variables. Plugging c,,, and c,  into (1  8), we obtain 
1 + (N - 1) 
r- 
W -L(  (l -  a) 1 + (N - 1) (  ~  ,)“(’-”  )k’ 
A comparison with expression (15) shows that, in the absence of tariffs, the 
relative return to the factors of production are the same as in the case of the 
closed economy. As the tariff rate increases, the relative return to capital falls. 
Note that this effect disappears in the case where the intermediate inputs are 
perfect substitutes (0 = 1). 
5.3.2  Trade When Countries Have Different Factor Proportions 
We now introduce two types of countries, which differ only in their capital 
endowment. In poor countries, each individual is endowed with one unit of 
capital, as well as one unit of labor (kp = 1). In rich countries, each individual 
owns one unit of labor and k, units of capital (where kr > 1). Since the capital- 
to-labor ratio in the poor country is 1, we will drop the subscript for the case 
of the rich country, and denote its capital-to-labor ratio simply as k. From equa- 
tion (13), the number of  varieties produced in rich countries will be larger than 
that in poor countries by a factor of k. We make the assumption that k is suffi- 
ciently large relative to the tariff rate to ensure that there is trade in agriculture.* 
The solution of the model involves solving for the prices of the factors of 
production (w~,  wp,  rr,  rp);  the equilibrium conditions in trade in an intermedi- 
ate input and agriculture, together with a normalization  and the  law of  one 
price for agriculture, give us the conditions to solve the system. 
We first find the demand for intermediate inputs. The relative price of capital 
in rich and poor countries will be denoted as p. Given that the cost and substitu- 
tion parameters p and 0 are assumed to be the same across countries, it follows 
from equation (1  1) that p is also equal to the price of the home varieties in a 
rich country ( p,J  relative to that of the home varieties in a poor country ( php): 
____  (  I +t-.-  )””-”’  1 
(26) 
8. The condition for trade in agriculture to occur is ((1 -  a)I,(k))/(wLk))  > 1, where I,(k) and 
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We can now write the prices of intermediate inputs faced by producers of man- 
ufactures in a rich country, in terms of the ones produced at home: 
where the subscript f  denotes foreign variety. Likewise, in a poor country, the 
prices are 
p.  =  (l+t)p. 
Ph  I 
The producers of manufactures  facing these relative prices will demand the 
following relative quantities of intermediate inputs. In rich countries, 
In poor countries, 
We use these relative consumptions to write the equation for equilibrium in 
the market for a variety produced in a rich country: 
where N,  and N, are the number of rich and poor countries, respectively. Notice 
that the supply for each variety is constant, as given by equation (12); chr  and 130  Antonio Spilimbergo and Ernest0 Stein 
chp,  on the other hand, depend on the respective prices of factors in rich and 
poor countrie~.~ 
Now we find the equilibrium condition in agriculture. Since agriculture is a 
homogeneous good, the law of one price requires that the price at home be the 
same whether the good is imported or produced domestically. Therefore, we 
can write pa,  =  pap(  1 + t).  The relative wage in rich and poor countries, then, is 
(33) 
The equilibrium in the agriculture sector is given by 
(34) 
The system formed by equations (32), (34), and (33), together with the normal- 
ization wp = 1, determines the prices of factors of production (r,,,  wp,  rr,  wJ. 
Since the equations in the system above are nonlinear, an analytical solution is 
not possible, so the model will be solved through simulations. 
5.3.3  Introducing Trade Arrangements 
The framework outlined in the previous section can be used to examine the 
welfare implications of different types of trading blocs. Their formation simply 
introduces changes in the set of relative prices faced in each type of country. 
For the case of a rich country, the set of relative prices faced by the producers 
of manufactures will now be 
(35) 
9. The results are derived following the same procedure of the previous section. cilr  is equal to 
%L  + k(t + I) 
0a  r. 
where 
is analogous to equation (20).  The detailed derivations are available upon request 131  Trading Blocs among Countries with Different Endowments 
where the  subscript b denotes members  of the bloc.  Likewise, in  the poor 
country, 
1,  Pfpb  = 
Php 
=  (I + t)p. 
PI,, 
In addition, whenever rich and poor countries are joined in a bloc, the price of 
agriculture in both  countries becomes equal, except in the case of  transport 
costs, which will be introduced below. With this new set of relative prices, it is 
possible to solve for the utility in both types of countries following the same 
procedure used in section 5.3.2. 
5.3.4  Introducing Transport Costs 
We will think of the world as being divided into C continents, each of them 
equidistant from one another. Each of these continents is formed by an equal 
number of rich and poor countries (Nr,  Np).  The transportation system within 
each continent is assumed to be a hub-and-spoke network.‘O In each continent 
there is a hub, through which all trade involving that continent must pass. Each 
hub has N  spokes (where N = Nr + Np), all assumed to be of equal length, 
connecting it to the N countries on the continent. Note that this is a completely 
symmetric world, except that some countries are rich and some are poor. Trans- 
port costs will be assumed, following Krugman (1980), to be of  Samuelson’s 
iceberg type, which means that only a fraction of the good shipped amves; the 
rest is lost along the way. The cost of transport from spoke to hub to spoke will 
be represented as a, while that of transport from hub to hub (across the ocean) 
is given by b, where 0 5  a, b 5  1. Trade involving two countries belonging to 
the same continent will have to be transported from the exporting country to 
the hub, and from the hub to the importing country. This involves two spokes, 
and therefore the transport cost within  a continent is a, so the fraction of a 
good shipped that amves at the market is 1 -  a.  Similarly, the fraction of  a 
good that arrives in the case of trade between countries in different continents, 
which involves two spokes and a hub-to-hub section, is (1 -  a)(  1 -  b). 
We assume that tariffs are levied on the total price paid for the good in the 
country of origin, which includes what is lost in transportation. An important 
thing to keep in mind is that once transport costs are allowed, there is a gap 
between consumption and quantity demanded. For example, in the case of  a 
10. In this, we follow Stein and Frankel (1994). 132  Antonio Spilimbergo and Ernesto Stein 
poor country, the relative price of a variety produced in a rich extracontinental 
country in the absence of blocs will be 
(1 + t)P 
(1 -  a)(l -  b)’ 
&:,  = 
Pi,,, 
. . - .  -.  ~  (37) 
where  the subscript x  stands for extracontinental.  The relative consumption 
will be 
and the relative demand will be 
(39) 
The rest of the relative prices, consumptions, and demands are determined ac- 
cordingly.  In particular,  the relative wage between the rich  and poor  coun- 
try will be  ]/[(I  -  a)(l -  b)],  if they belong to the same bloc, and (1 + t)/ 
[(  1 -  a)(  1 -  b)]  otherwise. 
Gf.. = ((1  ,ai(:,p  h))l-  1 
(1 -  a)(l -  b)’  dhv 
5.4  Welfare Implications of Trade Agreements 
In this  section, we use our model  to analyze the welfare  implications  of 
different types of trade arrangements. First, we come back to the question of 
the welfare effects of the consolidation of the world trading system into a few 
trading blocs. By changing the substitution parameters in the model, we will 
be able to see how these effects change as we move from the case where trade 
is explained mostly by product-variety considerations to one where compara- 
tive advantages play a large role in explaining trade. Second, in a simple world 
of four countries (two rich and two poor), we ask what is the optimal type of 
arrangement for each type of country, and how the answer changes for different 
values of the parameters. Finally, we introduce the possibility of PTAs (rather 
than just FTAs), and study the optimal level of intrabloc tariffs when continen- 
tal trading blocs are formed. 
5.4.1  Does Welfare Increase as the World Consolidates into Blocs? 
We  now address the Krugman versus Deardorff  and Stern debate. As dis- 
cussed in the introduction, Krugman’s product-variety model finds that, in the 
absence of transport costs, a world of a few large blocs results in the lowest 
level of welfare. In contrast, Deardorff and Stern suggest, using a comparative- 
advantage model, that welfare increases monotonically as the number of blocs 
becomes smaller, reaching maximum welfare under free trade. In figure 5.1, 
we present the results of simulations using our model, which incorporates both 
product variety and comparative advantages as motives for trade. 133  Trading Blocs among Countries with Different Endowments 
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Fig. 5.1  Product variety versus comparative advantages 
Notes: a = 0.5; t = 0.3;  k = 3; a = b = 0 (except a  = 0.3 where noted in key); C = 1, N  = 60. 
Each curve represents the welfare of  the world under different parameter 
values, as a function of the number of symmetrical blocs into which the world 
is divided. We work with a world of sixty countries, thirty rich and thirty poor. 
World welfare is obtained simply by averaging the welfare in rich and poor 
countries. All countries are assumed to levy the same tariff level on imports 
from outside the bloc (we use 30 percent in our simulations). Tariffs within the 
bloc are completely eliminated, as in FTAs." We use a value of (Y = 0.5, which 
means that half of the consumer's income is spent in agriculture and the other 
half in manufactures, and a value of k = 3, meaning that each individual in the 
rich country is endowed with three units of capital. The highest curve corre- 
sponds to a value of 8 = 0.75. In this case, the elasticity of substitution among 
varieties  is 4. The rest of the curves correspond to higher values of  8. As 8 
increases in value, preference for variety decreases, increasing the relative im- 
portance of comparative advantage as a source of gains from trade. As 8 ap- 
proaches  1, preference for variety disappears, and only differences in factor 
proportions explain trade. Intraindustry trade is eliminated, and only interin- 
dustry trade remains. 
For 8 = 0.75, the number of blocs  associated with minimum  welfare is 
three. This suggests that adding different factor proportions to a model with 
product variety does not change the implications in any significant way.  It is 
11. Since the tariff for the case of trade with countries outside the bloc is uniform, we do not 
distinguish here between FTAs and customs unions. 134  Antonio Spilimbergo and Ernest0 Stein 
only for extremely low preference for variety (high 8) that the model yields 
results similar to those in Haveman and in Deardorff  and Stern.l* Krugman’s 
conclusion, then, is more robust to the inclusion of comparative advantage in 
his model than Deardorff  and Stern’s is to the introduction of  preference for 
variety in one of the goods. The reason for this result is that the elasticity of 
substitution among varieties (given in our model by  1/(  1 -  0)) is much higher 
than that between goods (which is 1 under our Cobb-Douglas specification).” 
Thus, the elimination of tariffs when blocs are formed has a substantial effect 
on trade due to preference for variety (intraindustry trade), but a much smaller 
effect on trade due to comparative advantage. 
There is a sense, however, in which Krugman’s critics were right to suggest 
that he overestimated the extent of trade diversion. If one introduces transport 
costs into the picture, the factor-proportions  motive for trade becomes  rela- 
tively more important, since transport costs have a larger effect on intraindus- 
try trade than on interindustry trade, precisely because of the different elasticit- 
ies of substitution discussed above. Lower intraindustry trade means that there 
is less trade to be diverted once trading blocs are formed. Therefore, the effect 
of increasing transport costs a is not very different from that of increasing the 
value of 8, as is shown in figure 5.1, where the dotted line with triangles repre- 
sents welfare as a function of the number of blocs for the case of 8 = 0.85 and 
a = 0.3. We also tried different values of k and 01, but the results did not change 
in any significant way. 
5.4.2  What Type of Bloc Maximizes Welfare for Rich and Poor Countries? 
In this section, we work with a simple single-continent world that consists 
of four countries, two of them rich and two poor. Our model provides an ideal 
framework for the analysis of the welfare effects of  different trade arrange- 
ments. For example, what is the effect of north-north integration, on both rich 
countries and poor ones? Are the rich countries better off by forming blocs 
with poor countries or among themselves? 
We provide a framework to think about these questions. Figures 5.2 through 
5.5 show how the welfare of the rich (figures 5.2  and 5.3) and the poor (figures 
5.4 and 5.5) depends  on the  type  of trading  arrangements  that exist in the 
world, for different combinations of the parameters  01 and 0. For each set of 
parameter values, the welfare is normalized to be 1 for the case of nondiscrimi- 
natory tariffs, as under the most-favored-nation  (MFN) clause. 
Note that an increase in 8 results in a higher elasticity of  substitution be- 
tween varieties,  and thus  in greater changes in the consumption bundles  in 
response to given changes in relative prices. For this reason, the welfare effects 
12. The values of 0 for which Krugman’s result goes away correspond to elasticities of  substitu- 
tion that seem unreasonably high. 
13. This follows from the requirement that 8 be a positive number. It is a natural assumption to 
make, since one would expect the different varieties of intermediate inputs to be closer substitutes 
than the different goods. 0 
Fig. 5.2  Which arrangement should the rich country seek? 
Notes: (Y = 0.9; t = 0.3; k = 3; a = b = 0;  C = 1;  N = 4. 
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Fig. 5.5  Which arrangement should the poor country seek? 
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of trading blocs generally become more important for higher values of 8. As 0 
approaches 1, however, the taste for variety disappears, and so does the intrain- 
dustry trade, thus reducing the effects of trading blocs. This is the explanation 
for the shape of the curves in figures 5.2 through 5.5. 
As can be seen in figures 5.2 and 5.3, it is always the case that a bloc among 
the rich countries (RB  in the figure) makes the rich better off than MFN, while 
a bloc among the poor (PB) always hurts them. For parameter values that in- 
crease the relative importance of  product  variety  as a source of  gains from 
trade (high values  of a  and low values  of  O), welfare in the case of  a bloc 
among the rich is even higher than under free trade (FT). In the case of  the 
poor countries, a similar pattern can be observed in figures 5.4 and 5.5: their 
own bloc improves their welfare, while a bloc among the rich countries lowers 
it. This confirms the results obtained in Stein (1994) and Goto and Hamada 
(1994) for the case of blocs among similar countries: those countries that are 
left behind when blocs are formed are always worse off. This happens because 
those that form the bloc experience an improvement in their terms of trade, 
as each member of the bloc diverts demand from nonmembers toward fellow 
members. As expected, the effect of a rich bloc on the poor is larger than that 
of a poor bloc on the rich. 
In the case of  north-south integration (represented by NS/IVS), we did not 
allow for the formation of  a single bloc between two countrie~.'~  For this rea- 
son, we compare each country's  welfare under the north-south blocs with that 
under the north-northtsouth-south  blocs (NN/SS).  Figures 5.2 through 5.5 sug- 
gest that poor countries will always prefer north-south integration. This is true 
for both comparative-advantage and product-variety considerations. The rich 
country, however, would prefer to join another rich rather than a poor when 
product variety plays a large role. This preference becomes weaker for high 
values of 8 and low values of a,  when trade occurs mainly due to comparative 
advantage. Under comparative advantage, the rich country  would obviously 
prefer to join a poor. This, however, is not reflected  in the figure, due to the 
considerations discussed in footnote 14. 
So far, we have worked under the assumption that tariffs are the same in rich 
and poor countries. However, developed countries typically have lower rates 
of  protection than developing countries. For this reason, in what follows we 
will allow the tariff in the rich country (t,) to differ from that in the poor coun- 
try (tP).l5  In figures 5.6 and 5.7, t, is set at 30 percent, while t, varies between 
0 and 40 percent. For high levels of tr,  the results are qualitatively similar to 
the ones presented above. For low tariff levels in the rich country, however, the 
implications  are very different: a rich country would rather join a poor than 
14. The reason is that doing so would force us to consider four types of  countries: rich in the 
bloc and outside the bloc, and poor in the bloc and outside the bloc. One does not gain too much 
insight by doing so, and the model would get much more complicated. 
15. The idea of allowing for different tariffs in rich and poor countries was suggested to us by 
Arvind Panagariya. 138  Antonio Spilirnbergo and Ernest0 Stein 
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Fig. 5.6  Differentiated tariffs: the effects on the rich countries 
Notes: a  = 0.5; 0 = 0.75;  t,, = 0.3; k  = 3;  a = b = 0;  C  = I; N = 4. 
another rich  country  (figure  5.6); and, as figure 5.7 shows, the poor  would 
rather integrate among themselves than join the rich!lh The key to these results 
is the effect of the formation of blocs on the terms of trade. These effects are 
very different when the countries start from different tariff levels. We will pres- 
ent a simple example to provide the intuition for this result. 
Take a world of three symmetric countries, A, B, and C, where tariffs are 
nondiscriminatory, and uniform across countries. What are the effects on the 
terms of trade of the formation  of an FTA  between A and B? As  explained 
above, both countries deviate trade away from C, and in favor of their partners. 
As a result, relative world demand for goods produced in C declines, and so 
do its terms of trade, while those in A and B improve. In addition to the trade- 
diversion effect, there is a trade-creation  effect: both A and B will demand 
more goods from each other, at the expense of the demand for home goods. In 
this symmetric setting, this trade creation effect has no consequences for the 
terms of trade of A and B, since the effects in both countries cancel out, leaving 
demand unchanged.  However, this changes when tariffs  in A and B are not 
the same. 
Take now the extreme example where tariffs in A are zero, while those in B 
are positive. The following effects will take place if A forms an FTA with B: 
country B will deviate trade away from C in favor of A; B will also shift de- 
mand from itself to A (trade-creation effect). However, A will neither create 
nor deviate trade, since its tariff structure has not changed at all. The resulting 
16. We performed simulations for different values oft,,. The results are qualitatively similar. 139  Trading Blocs among Countries with Different Endowments 
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Fig. 5.7  Differentiated tariffs: the effects on the poor countries 
Nofes: a = 0.5;  8 = 0.75;  fP = 0.3; k = 3; a = b = 0; C = 1; N = 4. 
effect is a fall in the demand for the goods produced in country B. Therefore, 
the terms of trade of country B may actually fall when it enters into a bloc with 
A. In contrast, the improvement in country A's  terms of trade is even larger 
than in the case where the tariff levels in A and B are similar. We chose a tariff 
level in A of zero for simplicity, but the result goes through for any tariff in A 
sufficiently low. 
In the case where tariffs in the rich countries are sufficiently lower than 
those in the poor countries, this example helps us understand why both rich 
and poor countries might prefer to integrate with the p00r.l~ 
This type of analysis helps us understand some of the issues involved when 
a country like Chile has to decide whether to join NAFTA or Mercosur. We use 
this only as an illustrative example since our framework leaves out a number of 
other important considerations in making this decision. 
Under which conditions, then, will Chile prefer to join Mercosur rather than 
NAFTA?Is The passage above suggests that the larger the tariff in the rich 
country (NAFTA) relative to the poor (Mercosur and Chile), the more inclined 
Chile will be to join Mercosur. 
17. The results of our simulations involving different tariff rates are consistent with the conclu- 
sions reached by Panagariya (1995) using a three-country example. In his example, countries lose 
by granting preferential treatment to their partners, and gain when preferential treatment is ex- 
tended to them. In  this sense, Panagariya claims that the mercantilist approach is valid for analyz- 
ing tYTAs. 
18. In  what follows we treat Mercosur as a single poor country, and NAFTA as a single rich 
country. 140  Antonio Spilimbergo and Ernest0 Stein 
--  0.0  01  0.2  03  04  05  0.6 
Intercontinental transportation cost b 
Fig. 5.8  Should Chile join NAFTA or Mercosur? 
Notes: a = 0.9; f = 0.3; t, = 0.3; k = 3; u = 0; C  = 2; N = 4; I3  = 0.75. 
Another factor that plays a role in such a decision is the importance of inter- 
continental transport costs. To  address this question, we use a simulation in 
which the world consists of two continents with four countries each, and com- 
pare the poor country’s welfare under two different arrangements: one where 
each poor country joins the other poor on their continent, and another where 
each poor country joins a rich country on a different continent. 
The results for the case of tr =  f,,  are shown in figure 5.8. Under these param- 
eter values, only for very high transport costs across continents would Chile 
choose Mercosur instead of NAFTA. 
Figure 5.9 shows how much things can change when tariffs in rich and poor 
countries are different. In this case, tr = 0.1. The effects of joining Mercosur 
are qualitatively  similar to those in figure 5.8. But now the effects of joining 
NAFTA are completely different. Notice that for b = 0, joining NAFTA re- 
duces welfare with respect to MFN, as it does in figure 5.7 for the case of low 
tariffs in the rich countries. The reason is the same: when a high-tariff country 
joins a low-tariff country, its terms of trade will fall, provided the tariff differ- 
ential is sufficiently high. What figure 5.9 clearly illustrates is that transport 
costs can have surprising effects. In this case, the negative effect on Chile’s 
terms of trade becomes  smaller as trade with NAFTA decreases due to the 
increase in transport costs. When transport costs are sufficiently high, Chile 
prefers NAFTA to Mercosur. 
In  fact, this analysis suggests a reason why NAFTA itself might result in 
welfare losses for Mexico: it represents a trading bloc with a large proximate 
country (so terms-of-trade effects are large), which has much lower tariffs than 141  Trading Blocs among Countries with Different Endowments 
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Fig. 5.9  Should Chile join NAFTA or Mercosur? 
Nores: a = 0.5;  f,  = 0.1;  fn = 0.3; k = 3; a = 0;  C = 2; N = 4;  0 = 0.75 
they did (so terms-of-trade effects can be negative). This suggests that the asso- 
ciation between “natural” (meaning proximate) blocs and increases in welfare 
is valid only when the countries involved have tariff levels of the same order 
of magnitude. 
5.4.3  Product Variety, Comparative Advantage, and Supernatural Blocs 
Several authors, among them Krugman (1991b) and Summers (1991), have 
argued that if trading blocs are formed along “natural” lines of geographical 
proximity, they are likely to be good. Stein and Frankel (1994) and Frankel, 
Stein, and Wei (chap. 4 in this volume) have shown, in a model based on prod- 
uct variety, that it is possible for regionalization to go too far, even when blocs 
are formed along natural geographical lines. 
To reach this conclusion, they allowed for continental PTAs, where tariffs 
within  the  bloc  are reduced  but  not  necessarily  eliminated,  as in  the  case 
of FTAs. Starting from a nondiscrimination situation as under MFN, a small 
reduction  in  intrabloc  tariffs  always  improves  welfare:  there  are  positive 
returns to regionalization. As intrabloc tariffs continue to fall, however, welfare 
reaches a maximum level and starts to decline. Beyond the preference margin 
that maximizes welfare, there are negative returns to further regionalization. If 
the intrabloc tariff level continues to decline, welfare might become even lower 
than at the starting point, under MFN. In this case, the authors suggested that 
blocs were supernatural: regionalization is much deeper than what would be 
warranted by “natural” geographical considerations. 
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become supernatural is robust to the inclusion of comparative advantages in 
the model. To allow for PTAs, the model has to be modified slightly. The in- 
trabloc tariff level, instead of zero, will now be (1 -  IT) X t,  where T  represents 
the preference margin within the bloc. We  considered a world of  four conti- 
nents of eight countries each, four of them poor and four rich. Since the capital 
endowment in the rich countries was set at k = 3, this setting closely matches 
that in Stein and Frankel, where a world of four continents with sixteen coun- 
tries each was considered. 
Figure 5.10 shows the effects of increasing the preference margin TT on the 
welfare of the world, both the rich and the poor countries, for a value of inter- 
continental transport costs b = 0.35. In the figure, the welfare of each type is 
normalized to be  1 under MFN. We  can see that the inclusion of comparative 
advantage does not change the pattern reported by  Stein and Frankel. For this 
set of parameter values used in the simulation (0 = 0.75; a = 0.5; t = 0.3), 
the optimal preference margin is 43 percent, which corresponds to a level of 
intrabloc tariffs of around 17 percent. Blocs become supernatural for IT  = 0.82 
or when intrabloc tariffs are reduced below 6 percent.I9 
Keep in mind that, throughout this exercise, we ask about the welfare effects 
of symmetrical trading blocs. As shown in Stein (1994) for the case of similar 
countries, in a noncooperative game each bloc would in fact benefit from com- 
pletely eliminating intrabloc tariffs, since doing so improves their terms of 
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19. Our results are consistent with the implication in Meade (1955) that F'TAs  are in general 
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trade. However, this would result in lower welfare in each country as a result 
of a coordination failure in determining the margin of preference. 
In contrast, here we are focusing on the perspective of an organization such 
as the World Trade Organization (WTO), asking what would be the preference 
margin that, if adopted in every continent, would lead to the highest possible 
world welfare, assuming that free trade is not attainable and that tariff levels 
outside the bloc cannot be lowered rapidly. Figure 5.10 highlights an interest- 
ing issue that was not captured before: the margin of preference that maximizes 
the welfare of the world does not maximize the welfare of either the rich or 
the poor. In general, the poor will benefit from a greater preference margin. If 
WTO ever abandons article XXIV of GATT, which allows for FTAs but not for 
PTAs as exceptions to the MFN rule, and instead imposes the level of intrabloc 
preference margin allowed, the determination of this preference margin would 
depend on the relative political power of rich and poor countries in the WTO. 
Figure 5.11 shows how the optimal preference margin depends on intercon- 
tinental transport costs. As they become larger, welfare maximization requires 
a greater degree of continental integration. This result is similar to that ob- 
tained in Stein and Frankel (1994) and in Frankel, Stein, and Wei (chap. 4 in 
this volume). In the limit, if  transport costs are prohibitive across continents, 
welfare will be maximized under continental FTAs, which in this case would 
represent the ideal of free trade in each relevant world.20 
20. This extreme of prohibitive transport costs across continents was used by Krugman (1991b) 
as an example of  how natural trading blocs would be beneficial. 144  Antonio Spilimbergo and Ernesto Stein 
5.5  Conclusions 
Previous models that analyzed the welfare effects of trading arrangements 
were based either on product variety or on comparative advantage. The use of 
these models provided contradictory answers to some important questions. In 
this paper,  we have presented  a framework that encompasses  both  types  of 
models. We used our framework to address a number of important questions, 
and reached the following conclusions: 
1. In the absence of  transport  costs, the consolidation of  the world into a 
few trading blocs reduces welfare, as predicted by Krugman’s product-variety 
model. When transport costs are considered, a move toward free trade zones is 
more likely to improve welfare, as suggested by  the models based  on pure 
comparative advantage. 
2.  As long  as all countries have similar tariff  levels,  poor countries will 
always prefer to integrate with rich countries, due to both product-variety and 
comparative-advantage considerations. The rich country maximizes welfare by 
joining  other rich, except in the cases where product variety does not play a 
large role. A poor country would consider joining another poor rather than 
a rich only if  the two poor countries  are proximate  and transport  costs are 
sufficiently high. 
3.  However, differentiated tariff levels between rich and poor countries have 
important consequences for the welfare effects of trading arrangements. In the 
case of  FTAs,  joining  a high-tariff  country will enhance welfare more than 
joining a low-tariff country, other things being equal. Therefore, if rich coun- 
tries have lower tariffs, the poor might choose to integrate among themselves. 
4.  The association  between  “natural”  (meaning proximate)  blocs  and in- 
creases in welfare is valid only when the countries involved have tariff levels 
of the same order of magnitude. 
5. The result that integration can be too deep, even if drawn along natural 
geographical lines, is not affected by the inclusion of comparative advantages 
into a model where there is preference for variety. The level of intrabloc prefer- 
ence margin that maximizes welfare is different for the rich and for the poor. 
In general, poor countries would prefer deeper integration. 
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This paper provides a nice contribution  to a young  and growing literature. 
When 1 first sat down to think about this paper, I spent a little time, for my 
own benefit, putting the paper in its place within this literature. As my thoughts 
progressed,  so did a convenient graphic depiction of the relevant work; this 
depiction is figure 5C.  1. 
The literature was really initiated by Krugman (1991a). In this piece, Krug- 
man developed a trade model with differentiated products and optimal tariffs. 
He proceeded to analyze, in the context of  this regime, the effect on world 
welfare of a sequential process of customs union formation. His original find- 
ing was that world welfare would decline until we reached a world configura- 
tion  of  three countries.  Shortly thereafter, this  work was supplemented by 
Deardorff  and Stern (1994) and Haveman (1996). Both of these papers pro- 
vided results similar in spirit if not nature to those of Krugman. Instead of a 
Jon Haveman is professor of economics at Purdue University 146  Antonio Spilimbergo and Ernest0 Stein 
Paradigm 
Deardorff 
& Stem  Haveman  *  - - - - - - - - - -0 




I  I 
I  I 
I  I 
I  I 
I  I 
I  I 
I  I 
I  I 
I  I 
I  I 
I  I 
I  I 
I  I 
I  I 
I  I 
I  I 
Kmg+an (  1  )  I  I 
A  A  - 




Fig. 5C.1  Mapping out the literature 
world with differentiated products, trade in their world is determined by more 
traditional  comparative  advantage.  The results  provided  by  Deardorff  and 
Stem run counter to the Krugman result,  but this  is due to the inclusion of 
prohibitive tariffs. Having isolated trade diversion (Krugman 1) and trade cre- 
ation (Deardorff and Stem), the results in Haveman  stem from an approach 
that incorporates equal parts of each. The results largely reinforce the negative 
Krugman result and establish its robustness across different trade paradigms 
(the vertical axis in figure 5C.1). He goes on, however, to note that the decline 
in welfare can be eliminated if the blocs are restricted in their ability to raise 
their ex post external tariffs. 
Not  to be outdone,  Krugman  also extended  the literature and overturned 
his own result in Krugman (1991b) by incorporating prohibitive interregional 
transport  costs. With  this  modification, welfare  is seen to be  an increasing 
function of bloc formation. In a similar vein, Stein and Frankel (1994) provide 
a bridge between these extremes by allowing interregional transport costs to 
vary between zero and infinity. What they find is that bloc formation will in- 147  Trading Blocs among Countries with Different Endowments 
crease world welfare if it is undertaken by natural trading partners, those with 
sufficiently low transport costs. 
Having set this background, it is now clear where the current paper fits into 
the literature. The Spilimbergo and Stein paper is in the same spirit as the Stein 
and Frankel paper. That is, it is general enough to allow for a continuum of 
options along two separate dimensions. Spilimbergo and Stein allow for a con- 
tinuum of possible interregional transport costs and all manner of trading re- 
gimes between comparative advantage and differentiated products. Their con- 
tribution, then, is the bold lines in the figure. On its face, their contribution 
appears to be  more substantial than that of  any other author. Other aspects 
of their model include countries of different sizes and varied degrees of bloc 
preference; that is, countries need not totally eliminate the barriers between 
them when forming a bloc. 
Having filled in the literature map, we can now turn to more specific issues 
associated with this paper. Having contributed to the literature myself, I was 
predisposed to appreciate this work. Whenever one sees a simulation analysis, 
however, one has to ask if this is an appropriate place for it. Simulation analysis 
does have a place in economic analysis, and my take is that the current model 
is sufficiently complex that this is as good a place as any for it. That notwith- 
standing, I do have a number of concerns. 
First, I admire Spilimbergo and Stein’s effort to incorporate production into 
the analysis. This was notably absent from the Krugman and Haveman work. 
On the other hand, it is not clear that production  is present in other than its 
name. That is, in the absence of the ability to substitute capital for labor and 
vice versa, and a differentiated products model with the number of varieties 
given exogenously, is production  really  incorporated  into the model  in  any 
meaningful way? I would contend that in fact it is not; what we have is really 
a world full of endowment economies. While stealth can work for warfare, it 
can be rather misleading in a paper such as this; that is, it makes it very difficult 
for the reader to discern the true source of the results. 
A second concern stems from the choice of  tariffs in the model. Without 
some notion  as to where the tariffs lie relative to some benchmark, perhaps 
optimal tariffs, one is unsure how to go about the interpretation of their effects. 
In particular, in figure 5.3, as we increase the degree of product differentiation, 
the extent to which the tariffs influence matters changes. The greater the degree 
of product differentiation, the higher will be optimal tariffs, and the less rele- 
vant will be any fixed tariff. So, while 1  admit that we seldom witness optimal 
tariffs in practice, I will put them forward as a useful theoretical tool. When 
analyzing phenomenon that we do not understand, it is best to make use of 
tools that we understand.  I argue that we understand the impact of optimal 
tariffs to a greater extent than  we understand  the influence of any arbitrary 
tariff. 
Third, the model introduces an asymmetry of country size. While I applaud 
this addition, it is not clear what it contributes to our understanding. Asymme- 148  Antonio Spilimbergo and Ernest0 Stein 
try for its own sake is not terribly meaningful unless you think about the moti- 
vation for its introduction. There are any variety of motivations to which one 
might  appeal to justify its inclusion,  none of  which  seem to apply here. In 
particular, the motivation for small countries to join into blocs with large coun- 
tries is to obtain an enhanced number of varieties of goods. I would argue that 
this motivation is not well represented in reality. Poor countries are more often 
striving to secure a source of supply for their limited needs than they are trying 
to vary their day-to-day diet. My fear is that without a firm grounding in reality, 
the asymmetry assumption and its corresponding result on the preference mar- 
gins are rendered vacuous. 
Finally, I would like to address the presentation of the results. The difference 
between  standard theory and simulations is somewhat akin to the difference 
between a Ferrari and a Jeep Cherokee. The Ferrari is a wonderful tool, and it 
will  do many  special things  for you. If, however, your  goal is to climb the 
Himalayas, one would do better driving the Cherokee. Granted the Cherokee 
will not take you to the top, but it will smooth out many rough spots. What 
these authors have done is to abandon their Ferrari, an act with which I have 
no problem, jumped into the Cherokee, driven up to the end of the foothills 
of the Himalayas, stepped out of the Cherokee, and examined the view from 
there. All of this rather than pushing the Cherokee to its limits. 
All of this is by way of saying that they are using a powerful tool but are not 
making use of all that it has to offer. As an example, in each of the graphs, a 
small number  of  observations is presented.  The computer is capable, and is 
tireless in this endeavor, of producing a nice smooth continuum of observations 
for each of the figures provided. In addition, with respect  to my remarks on 
the chosen tariff level, there is no reason not to produce results for many differ- 
ent choices of  tariffs and then publish  an average, with perhaps a high-low 
element built into the figure. There are powerful tools that might be brought to 
bear on this project, and the results would be strengthened tremendously  by 
using them. 
Having said my piece, I would like to finish by saying that I like the direction 
in which this paper is heading. It will be an important contribution to an im- 
portant literature. As trading blocs become the call of the day, understanding 
their influence on the world as a whole is very important. 
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Comment  Edward E. Leamer 
Spilimbergo and Stein have tackled a very difficult and extremely important 
problem: Are we in a Heckscher-Ohlin world or a Chamberlinian world? Is it 
factor supplies that drive trade, or is it economies of scale, product differentia- 
tion, and strategic interactions? 
As NAFTA was under consideration, workers earning $10 an hour in the 
United States looked south with Heckscher-Ohlin glasses and saw a huge Mex- 
ican low-skilled low-wage workforce that was prepared to do the same work 
for less than a $1 an hour. A sharp fall in U.S. wages for low-skilled workers 
seemed an inevitable consequence of economic integration with Mexico. 
Many  Mexicans looked north  with Chamberlinian  glasses.  They saw the 
technological leadership of the United States and the skilled U.S. workforce 
and the large, highly efficient operations of U.S. businesses, and they worried 
that in an economic partnership with such a country Mexicans would be stuck 
with the “bad” jobs in the “bad” sectors, namely those that offered no econo- 
mies of scale and very low levels of learning by doing. Mexicans in the twenty- 
first century would be sewing shirts in sweatshops and assembling electronics 
while U.S. workers would be writing software in fancy oftice buildings. 
Which are the “right” kind of glasses? How much of the consequences of 
NAFTA will be driven by Heckscher-Ohlin comparative-costs considerations 
and how much by economies of scale, externalities, and hysteresis? 
Answers to these important questions  can be  sought using  four different 
methodologies: theory, calibration, indirect estimation, and direct observation. 
By theory I mean writing down a fairly simple model that includes both 
Heckscher-Ohlin  (HO)  and  Chamberlinian  possibilities  and  then  deriving 
qualitative results about the conditions under which one effect dominates. For 
example, a familiar result in an HO framework is that an abundant factor bene- 
tits from economic integration and a scarce factor suffers. Maybe one could 
write down a structure that would lead to a new result: in countries abundant 
in human capital, both  skilled and unskilled workers benefit from economic 
integration; but in countries that are scarce in human capital, unskilled workers 
benefit but skilled workers suffer. Or something like this. 
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By calibration I mean writing down a relatively complex model into which 
are inserted “plausible”  numerical  values for the parameters, and then using 
the system to simulate an intervention such as NAFTA. The system has to be 
too complex to solve analytically because it includes features that are intended 
to capture all the relevant aspects of the problem. By indirect estimation I mean 
writing  down  a  not  too complex  model  and  estimating  it with  appropriate 
econometric techniques. By direct observation I mean finding equivalent his- 
torical events such as the entrance of  Portugal and Spain into the European 
Common Market, or waiting to see what happens as a result of NAFTA. 
Which of  these approaches is fruitful? Which is best? What do we mean 
by best? 
I take it as given that the goal should be to change our minds. With that as 
the goal, each of these four approaches can be fruitful. Any of them can change 
the mind of the analyst and if he or she is lucky can also change the mind of 
the analyst’s audience. But each can turn out disappointing. And if  we don’t 
keep our eyes firmly focused on the goal, sometimes an approach is bound to 
be disappointing. 
This paper that I am discussing falls somewhere between the first two ap- 
proaches, theory and computable  general  equilibrium modeling. The model 
that is used is too complex to allow qualitative theorems. But it is not as com- 
plex as most CGE models, which attempt more completely to include all rele- 
vant factors. It looks to me to be equivalent to a model with taste for variety 
driven  by  a Cobb-Douglas  utility  function  written  in  terms  of  agricultural 
goods and the services of manufactures, the latter being a Dixit-Stiglitz index 
of product variety in manufactures. Each variety is produced subject to a fixed 
cost. The model also includes transport costs that  separate countries. Using 
this structure, the authors provide what might be called numerical theorems. 
As such, the approach will make neither the theorists nor the CGE modelers 
very happy. Theorists will not be happy because numerical theorems by their 
very nature are extremely special cases. Theorems derive their value from be- 
ing both mathematically fragile and substantively sturdy A theorem is mathe- 
matically fragile if no assumption can be relaxed without altering the validity 
of  the  theorem. A theorem  is substantively  sturdy  if  substantively “minor” 
changes in the  assumptions  do not alter the  “content”  of  the  theorem. The 
problem with a numerical theorem is that it is very hard to tell if it is mathemat- 
ically fragile and  substantively  sturdy. Spilimbergo and  Stein do attempt to 
address the question of fragility. Here is a quotation: “It is only for extremely 
low preference for variety (high 0) that the model yields results similar to those 
in Haveman and in Deardorff and Stern. Krugman’s conclusion, then, is more 
robust to the inclusion of comparative advantage in his model than Deardorff 
and Stern’s is to the introduction of preference for variety in one of the goods.” 
I wonder what they would say if I used their model with y = 0”’Oo,  and claimed 
that for wide ranges of y the model is similar to Haveman and Deardorff and 151  Trading Blocs among Countries with Different Endowments 
Stem? In other words, the words “extremely low preference for variety” have 
no real meaning. 
A useful theorem makes us look at the world in a new way. Either it lays out 
the issues with increased clarity or it suggests some surprising implications. 
This paper is very good in terms of laying out the issues: comparative costs, 
fixed costs, and distance. But I don’t think that the results are both sturdy and 
surprising. If one mixes together distance, comparative costs, and economies 
of  scale/product differentiation, what are the possibilities? A country should 
look for a faraway partner? Probably not. Not much to be gained there. A poor 
country should look for a rich neighbor or a poor one? A rich country should 
look for a rich partner or a poor one? This could go either way If you tell me 
there  is a definite answer,  I  think that  I  could produce an equally plausible 
model with the reverse answer. Should a country look for a partner with high 
tariff walls or low ones? If you are planning to sell into the partner’s market, 
better that it is a protected market with a high tariff. 
Theorists won’t  find these numerical theorems much to  their liking.  CGE 
modelers will also be unhappy with the model presented here because it is far 
too  simple. There are no Mexican oil exports, no migration  from southern 
Mexico to the north or to the United States, no Mexican apparel exports, no 
Chinese apparel exports, no maquiladoras, no capital flows, no Japanese direct 
investment, no Mexican land policy, no Pacto, no. . . 
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